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Coalitions Matter: Citizenship, Women, 
and Quota Adoption in Africa 
Alice J. Kang1 and Aili Mari Tripp2 
1 University of Nebraska–Lincoln
2 University of Wisconsin, Madison
Abstract
We provide new theory and evidence of the role of domestic women’s coalitions in 
the adoption of gender quotas. Previous research has shown the importance of wom-
en’s movements to policy change. We show that specific types of mobilization, of-
ten multiethnic in character, are a more precise way of describing these influences. 
Using a new dataset of coalitions in 50 countries in Africa (1989–2014), we first 
examine where coalitions are likely to emerge. Controlling for factors that corre-
late with their formation, we find that when domestic women’s organizations form 
a coalition for quotas, governments are more likely to adopt them and do so more 
quickly. This correlation holds when controlling for international aid, involvement 
of international women’s movements, and whether countries recently emerged out 
of major armed conflict, complementing recent scholarship that highlights global 
influences. A comparative case study of the adoption of a gender quota in Senegal 
and non-adoption in Benin helps illustrate the nuances of the theory. 
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There have been two moments in contemporary history when women’s citizenship in the form of political rights expanded glob-
ally. The first was the extension of full suffrage to women, which 
started in the late nineteenth century, and the second was a major 
increase in women’s legislative representation, starting in the mid-
1990s.1 While both moments were influenced by international and do-
mestic events, most crossnational studies explaining the large jump 
in women’s descriptive representation in Africa (including North Af-
rica) between 1990 and 2015 (from 7.7 to 28.4%) have focused on the 
role of foreign donors, transnational advocacy networks, and global 
events like the 1995 United Nations (UN) Fourth World Conference on 
Women in Beijing.2 Most crossnational studies have focused on the in-
ternational dimension, in part, because it is easier to quantify using 
data produced by international actors.3 
We show how the domestic and international dimensions worked 
in tandem in African countries after the 1990s to improve women’s 
political representation, however, we draw on new evidence to focus 
on the role of women’s coalitions in these processes. Our findings take 
us beyond the work of Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, who show 
how domestic actors bring international pressure to bear on reluctant 
states to advance women’s rights.4 While this has been a tactic em-
ployed by some social movements, we show that without significant 
pressure from within a country in the form of a coalition, quota laws 
are rarely adopted. Spreading in three waves, by 2016 at least 54 coun-
tries legally required party quotas and another 23 adopted reserved 
seats for women, but not all countries have introduced such reforms.5 
Bridging the interest group, public policy, and social movement lit-
eratures on collective action among organizations, we theorize that 
coalitions of organizations at the national level play an important role 
in multiple ways: (1) by identifying policy gaps, (2) by proposing spe-
cific policy solutions, (3) by adapting proposals to the national con-
text, (4) by signaling domestic support, and (5) by signaling broad-
based (e.g., multiethnic) support. Much of the literature on gender 
quotas to date has recognized the role of domestic factors in bringing 
about change, but not on coalitions as we do.6 
Theories of coalitions of organizations have been developed and 
tested to better understand education, environmental, civil rights, reg-
ulatory, and social welfare policy mostly in the United States and Eu-
rope.7 Scholars have compiled information about women’s collective 
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action through the Research Network on Gender Politics and the State 
(RNGS), and S. Laurel Weldon’s earlier work and subsequent study 
with Mala Htun developed comparative measures of women’s move-
ments, focusing primarily on established democracies.8 Yet the role 
of women’s organizing largely remains untested in the global South, 
where gender quota laws first emerged. 
Addressing these gaps, we provide a first test of the hypothesis that 
when women’s organizations form a coalition for gender quotas, their 
countries are more likely to adopt them and do so at a faster pace. In-
spired by work on women’s movements in the United States,9 we use 
a dataset that we created of pro-quota women’s coalitions from 1989 
to 2014 in 50 countries in Africa, where scholars expect international 
influences to be strong. We hope this Africa-based measure will in-
spire further work on domestic organizations and political change in 
the global South. 
Using event history models, we conduct a two-step analysis. First, 
we ask where coalitions are likely to form to examine the possibility 
that they are endogenous. To help minimize bias in our findings about 
coalitions, we then include variables that might correlate with the rise 
of coalitions in our statistical analysis of the adoption of quotas. We 
include a measure of postconflict status, which is found to be impor-
tant in Africa, in part because of the role disruptions in gender rela-
tions during conflict.10 We also control for the type of electoral system 
and level of economic development. Ultimately, we find that domes-
tic women’s coalitions correlate with the adoption of gender quotas 
in addition to having a postconflict context and connections to the in-
ternational women’s movement. 
Our study makes three contributions. First, we call attention to 
the formation and role of domestic women’s coalitions—occupying a 
middle ground between individual policy entrepreneurs and transna-
tional advocacy networks— in the spread of major innovations con-
cerning women’s rights. Second, we suggest that women’s movements 
in the case of gender quotas take a particular form of coalition build-
ing across ethnic and political cleavages. Third, by examining how do-
mestic pressures influence political reform, our study has implications 
for similar movements around climate change and other environmen-
tal issues, children’s rights, human rights, and many other concerns. 
The first section outlines our theory of domestic coalitions, fol-
lowed by quantitative analyses of their rise and role relative to other 
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influences. We compare Benin and Senegal to examine the nuances 
of our theory, and then discuss the importance of coalitions based on 
the statistical evidence and case studies. In the last section, we point 
to women’s coalitions as a direction for future research on the imple-
mentation of women’s rights reforms and substantive representation 
of women. Our conclusion further discusses the implications of our 
study for understanding major change in other policy areas, and for 
studies outside of Africa. 
Domestic Women’s Coalitions and Gender Quotas:  
A Meso-Level Theory 
Coalitions are the temporary, decision-oriented, joint use of resources 
by two or more social units. Coalitions work toward a decision (or 
what William Gamson calls “a selection among alternatives”), which 
if realized, produces a payoff for the participants.11 Since the advo-
cacy explosion of the 1960s in the United States, scholars of interest 
groups, public policy, and social movements have shared an interest 
in the emergence and impact of collective action among social orga-
nizations, which is our focus.12 
Much of the literature on gender quotas has recognized the role 
of women’s activism in bringing about these reforms, but few have 
sought to explicitly develop a theory of coalitions as we do. Some ac-
counts focus on grassroots women’s organizations,13 cross-partisan 
networks,14 women’s organizations within parties,15 and individuals 
within the national women’s machinery.16 The literature on Africa has 
also examined the role of women’s mobilization in these various fora.17 
Why focus on coalitions of organizations and not policy entrepre-
neurs, social movements, or transnational networks? We suggest that 
coalitions are in a distinct position to help name problems, propose and 
adapt specific policy solutions, and help signal domestic and broad-
based support for change. While noting that countries may adopt ma-
jor reforms in the absence of women’s coalitions, we observe that in Af-
rica it has been the case that coalitions are involved in quota adoption. 
Coalitions Identify Problems 
When organizations come together, they can help identify and priori-
tize unequal representation as a problem of national import. Naming 
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is critical for policy action. Without the perception that something is 
wrong, policymakers may see no need for innovation. Individual pol-
icy entrepreneurs may be the first to identify a policy gap, but to put 
an issue on the national agenda, they require coalitions that pool hu-
man and financial resources. The joint use of resources is needed to 
disseminate pamphlets, issue press releases, speak on the radio and 
television, hold public meetings and workshops, and protest in the 
streets, as we will see in the case of Senegal. Sarah Soule and Brayden 
King’s study of women’s movements in the United States finds that 
women’s organizations exert the most leverage over policymaking at 
this agenda-setting stage.18 Scholars of women’s movements in semi-
authoritarian and authoritarian contexts such as Uganda find that 
women’s groups help bring new issues to the national arena.19 Thus we 
expect domestic coalitions (and social movements) to play an agenda-
setting role in democracies and at times in autocracies. 
How do women’s organizations come by the idea to name under-
representation as a public problem? Women’s organizations can be-
come inspired to identify new public problems through their partic-
ipation in global conferences, by reading international treaties and 
declarations, or by hearing about women’s successes or reform in 
other countries. Nevertheless, prior to the heightened efforts by the 
United Nations and other international entities to increase women’s 
representation, it was often women on the ground in countries such 
as Tanzania and Uganda that articulated to domestic audiences the 
need to include more women in positions of power. For instance, the 
issue of women’s underrepresentation became a national agenda item 
in the Republic of Niger only after leaders of women’s organizations 
organized a massive protest in 1991.20 
Coalitions Propose Specific Solutions 
Coalitions advocate for a decision. This makes them distinct from so-
cial movements, which are broader and may internally disagree over 
what kind of change is necessary.21 Coalitions, as Kevin Hula writes, 
“serve as institutional mediators reconciling potentially disparate pol-
icy positions, in effect ‘predigesting’ policy proposals before they are 
served to the legislature.”22 By articulating a preference for a specific 
policy, coalitions can help policymakers who are amenable to backing 
gender quotas for self-interested reasons but are faced with a surfeit 
of options. International statements such as the Beijing Platform of 
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Action and Inter-Parliamentary Union’s (IPU) Plan of Action provide 
a large menu of choices for improving women’s descriptive represen-
tation, of which the adoption of a gender quota is only one.23 Women 
on the ground, while not the only national-level actor that can pro-
pose specific policies, can and do suggest content for nascent quota 
legislation, as was the case in Uganda during the constitution mak-
ing process.24 
In the literature on African politics, scholars note that party sys-
tems in many countries are fragmented, making it a challenge for par-
ties to coalesce interests.25 One recent study finds that in the 2000s, 
civil society actors were more likely to stake out policy positions in 
the media than were political parties or candidates in seven African 
countries, except for Ghana and Kenya.26 This suggests that coalitions 
of organizations may be influential not just in wealthy democracies 
in the global North but also in new democracies in the global South. 
Coalitions Adapt Solutions to the National Context 
Sally Engle Merry argues that for internationally circulated ideas to 
be effective at home, they “need to be translated into local terms and 
situated within local contexts of power and meaning.”27 Much of the 
existing qualitative scholarship on the adoption of quotas shows that 
women’s organizations use locally relevant frames that fit with pre-
existing discourses to advocate for quotas.28 Moreover, the translation 
of norms into policy is not a smooth process, but one often marked 
with setbacks. Coalitions, working toward a common end, can help 
shepherd a policy through expected and unexpected roadblocks, as 
we will explore in our case study of Senegal. This persistent fine-tun-
ing of new policy solutions is what sociologist Holly McCammon calls 
“strategic adaptation.”29 
Coalitions Signal Domestic Support 
Domestic coalitions can help signal to policymakers that demand for 
change is not only international. Policymakers, in the absence of clear 
domestic support, may not perceive new proposals as worth the in-
vestment of scarce resources. When asked about the role of the inter-
national community and the state in adopting quotas in Algeria, the 
lawyer and head of the local organization Le Centre d’information 
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sur les droits de l’enfant et de la femme (CIDDEF) Nadia Ait-Zai 
responded: 
We have been helped by the international communities. But the 
first work was done here in Algeria. When we wanted more rep-
resentativeness of women in politics, the work was first made 
in Algeria and it is we who did it. Indeed, CIDDEF launched a 
partnership advocacy campaign with political parties and with 
associations to tell the president we wanted a quota for women 
in parliament and not less than 30 percent.30 
Today at 32%, Algeria has the highest rate of representation of 
women in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Coalitions Signal Broad-based Support 
Coalitions can help signal mass support for major reform. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, women’s activists moved away from the post-
independence phenomenon in which mobilization at the national level 
fell under one large national association that was often tied to the rul-
ing party or the state. These organizations were not autonomous (e.g., 
Ghana’s 31st December Women’s Movement, Kenya’s Maendeleo ya 
Wanawake, Nigeria’s Better Life for Rural Women Programme).31 With 
democratization in the 1990s, statist associations of this type declined 
in prominence, and newer and smaller women’s organizations pro-
liferated.32 In this contemporary political landscape, women’s groups 
have sought to form coalitions.33 
To be clear, not all groups need to agree that quotas ought to be 
a priority. In Algeria, women’s groups agreed that increasing wom-
en’s parliamentary representation was necessary, but some saw quo-
tas as an elitist aspiration that could wait. Others thought the women 
elected would not be qualified, and there were divisions over quota 
adoption for this reason. But a coalition for gender quotas was formed 
nevertheless. 
In societies where ethnic difference is politicized, coalitions that cut 
across salient cleavages can help demonstrate wide-ranging support 
for reform. Kenya’s quota adoption process is a case in point. From 
the outset, women activists played a central role in the convoluted, 
acrimonious, and lengthy constitution-making process in Kenya.34 As 
Jill Cottrell and Yash Ghai (the first head of the Constitution of Kenya 
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Review Commission) wrote, “They made full and skillful use of the 
opportunities opened up by the review for women in particular…. The 
group which came out best from the process were women, who were 
able to present a united and coordinated position, transcending ethnic 
or religious distinctions.”35 The activists not only advanced a women’s 
rights agenda, but they also played an important role in moving the 
overall constitutional process forward and finding common ground be-
tween competing groups. Bridging across difference has taken place 
in other polarized contexts. In Somalia, women’s activists created a 
Rainbow Coalition cutting across clan differences to press for a quota 
in the constitution-making process, with some degree of success. Sim-
ilar multiethnic initiatives took place in other countries, in peace talks 
(e.g., Burundi),36 constitutional reform processes (e.g., Zimbabwe), 
and legislative reform (e.g., Senegal). 
Indeed, the politicization of ethnic difference may propel women 
to form coalitions. In patronage-based systems, women are often ex-
cluded from what Linda Beck calls a “hidden public.”37 This is the case 
in countries such as Kenya, South Africa (particularly until 1994), and 
the United States (particularly until 1920) where a colonial state fa-
vored men over women and a postcolonial state perpetuated the po-
litical salience of ethnicity and race.38 Further, scholars have found 
that ethnic-minority parties in proportional representation systems 
are more likely than others to exclude women.39 Multiethnic mobili-
zation especially among women often occurs in the context of con-
flict as women build cross-cleavage coalitions to fight for peace and 
advance a women’s-rights agenda that often includes quotas.40 Given 
that quotas ostensibly benefit all women, it should not be surprising 
that, for strategic reasons, women’s organizations would draw multi-
ethnic support for quotas among other demands. 
In sum, while there is no question that individual policy entrepre-
neurs and the diffusion of ideas from one country to the next are im-
portant in understanding domestic policy change, the adoption of gen-
der quotas is not self-executing. We hypothesize that when women’s 
organizations form a coalition for gender quotas, countries are more 
likely to make the change and to do so at a faster pace. 
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Gender Quota Adoption in Africa: A Quantitative Analysis 
In seeking to explain how major change occurs in women’s rights, we 
examine whether, when controlling for a variety of factors, domestic 
women’s coalitions for gender quotas correlates with the likelihood 
and pace of adoption of quota laws. Because the formation of coali-
tions may not be exogenous, we first consider where they are likely to 
emerge. We then include the same variables in the analysis of quota 
adoption to avoid producing spurious findings.41 
We use discrete time event history models with the complemen-
tary log-log (clog-log) link function. Discrete time models are appro-
priate due to the interval nature of our data and the presence of tied 
event times, as shown in figure 1.42 The complementary log-log trans-
formation is analogous to the popular Cox continuous time hazard 
model. It, however, requires the analyst to choose a representation of 
the underlying hazard function and test for violations of the propor-
tional hazards assumption.43 For these purposes, we use a linear vari-
able for time, with which we interact select variables.44 
Figure 1. The adoption of gender quotas in Africa, 1989-2014. The line shows the 
cumulative number of countries with gender quotas laws or reserved seats for 
women in the lower-house or unicameral legislature that meet a 10 percent mini-
mum threshold. Bars refer to the number of adoptions in the given year. 
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We consider the risk of adoption to begin with Uganda’s introduc-
tion of a reserved seat system in 1989. Countries enter the data set 
in this year, except for Eritrea and Namibia, which gained indepen-
dence in 1993 and 1990 respectively, and exit when they experience 
the event in interest or reach the year 2014. The number of countries 
in the models varies from 41 to 50. 
Our central dependent variable is the likelihood that a country 
will adopt a gender quota, given that it has not done so. By gender 
quotas, we mean constitutional provisions or legislation mandating a 
minimum 10% women’s share of seats in the lower house or unicam-
eral legislature.45 Twenty-seven countries in our sample adopted gen-
der quotas between 1989 and 2014: Algeria (2012), Angola (2005), 
Burkina Faso (2009), Burundi (2004), Cape Verde (2010), Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (2011), Republic of Congo (2007), Djibouti 
(2002), Egypt (2009), Eritrea (1994), Guinea (2010), Kenya (2010), 
Lesotho (2011), Liberia (2005),46 Libya (2012), Mauritania (2006), 
Morocco (2011), Niger (2000), Rwanda (2003), Senegal (2010), Su-
dan (2008), Swaziland (2005), Tanzania (1992), Togo (2012), Tuni-
sia (2011), Uganda (1989), and Zimbabwe (2013). Somalia and South 
Sudan, excluded from the statistical tests, adopted a gender quota in 
2004 and 2011 respectively.47 
Women’s coalitions equals zero as a default and takes a value of 
one if two or more domestic social organizations work collectively 
around the adoption of a party candidate law or reserved seat system 
for women in the lower house or unicameral legislature. Social organi-
zations are often women’s organizations, led by women and concerned 
with women’s gendered experiences, but they can include others such 
as human rights associations. To code coalitions, we used a combina-
tion of secondary sources and news stories from more than 100 na-
tional newspapers, national wires, and international wires, conduct-
ing searches in Arabic, French, Portuguese, and Spanish, in addition 
to English. This method is similar to Alice Kang’s work on civil soci-
ety representation of women and the ratification of the African Union 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, also known as the Maputo Protocol. Ours 
differs in that we include secondary sources and code specifically for 
coalitions.48 As some coalitions may be less visible, and to check that 
we do not overlook unsuccessful ones, we corroborated our coding 
with country experts for countries where it was not apparent that a 
coalition had formed. 
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What does and does not count as a pro-quota coalition? We include 
formal (e.g., the Libyan Women’s Platform for Peace) and informal co-
alitions (e.g., of the Association des femmes tunisiennes pour la re-
cherché sur le développement and the Ligue tunisienne des droits de 
l’homme, among others, in Tunisia). Because the pursuit of a shared 
and specific goal is central to the concept of coalitions, organizations 
that do not make an explicit call for candidate quota laws or reserved 
seats are not coded as such. For instance, in Mali, women’s organiza-
tions came together in a coalition, along with government allies, to 
advocate for a reform to the electoral code to include a gender quota 
for party lists.49 (Mali has yet to adopt a gender quota.) By contrast, in 
Malawi, women’s organizations have united around the issue of cam-
paign finance.50 We also looked for signs of cooperation among orga-
nizations (e.g., the issuing of a collective declaration, a joint meeting 
with a policymaker). In Botswana, we have not seen indications of co-
ordination among multiple women’s organizations for quotas. In Swa-
ziland, one, but not multiple, organization called for a gender quota.51 
(Swaziland adopted a quota.) 
Our models include controls for international or transnational in-
fluences. The growth (or decline) in the International women’s move-
ment may encourage domestic coalitions to form and countries to 
adopt quotas.52 Countries where women are more embedded in the 
global women’s movement may be more likely to have coalitions and 
quotas. To measure embeddedness, we use Log women’s NGOs at Bei-
jing per 1 million, the natural log of the number of women’s NGOs 
that attended the UN World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 
scaled by population size.53 We include an interaction term for the in-
ternational women’s movement and a country’s embeddedness in the 
movement.54 Countries may respond to incentives from established 
democracies to adopt gender quotas.55 Log DAC aid per capita (t-1) 
is the natural log of official development aid per capita disbursed by 
members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to coun-
try i in current US dollars, lagged one year.56 This excludes aid from 
autocracies and semi-autocracies.57 In models not reported here, we 
control for the presence of a liberalizing UN peacekeeping operation, 
which may transmit new ideas about what is beneficial for the coun-
try’s reputation abroad and push for quotas.58 
We also include controls for the domestic political context. The end 
of war may be an opportune time for the formation of coalitions and 
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adoption of gender quotas.59 Postconflict equals one if country i was in 
its last year of major armed conflict after 1986 and through the first 
postconflict election; it is zero otherwise.60 Level of democracy, based 
on Polity IV, varies from –10 to 10.61 Transitions to democracy osten-
sibly create new opportunities for coalition formation and institu-
tional reform, though not all new democracies adopt gender equality 
policies.62 Democratic transition equals one if country i experienced 
a transition from autocracy (equal to or less than –6 on the Polity IV 
scale) to anocracy or a hybrid regime (–5 to 5); from anocracy to de-
mocracy (equal to or greater than 6); or from autocracy to democracy 
in the previous three years. 
Other domestic political variables include the Ethnic Power Rela-
tions’ Number of ethnopolitical groups, the number of politically rel-
evant ethnic groups in country i in year t.63 The politicization of eth-
nic difference may encourage women to form pro-quota coalitions, as 
discussed in the previous section. It may be easier to adopt quota laws 
in proportional representation than in first-past-the-post systems.64 
Plurality electoral system equals one if country i uses a majoritarian 
electoral system for the lower house or unicameral legislature as of 
or close to January 1; it is zero otherwise.65 If the legislature is sus-
pended, we carry over the previous system. If the country is under 
one or no party rule, or if indirect elections are used, the variable is 
coded as missing, which makes plurality highly left-censored.66 Left-
leaning rule equals one if the party of the country’s executive or larg-
est party in year t is communist, socialist, or social democratic; it is 
zero otherwise.67 Women in parliament, % is the percentage of women 
in the lower house or unicameral legislature in country i as of or near 
January 1 in year t.68 
Finally, we include controls for socioeconomic and cultural condi-
tions. Modernization theory suggests poorer countries and predom-
inantly Muslim countries may be slower to form coalitions or adopt 
gender quotas.69 Log GNI per capita (t–1) is the natural log of gross 
national income per capita (Atlas method) for country i in current US 
dollars, lagged one year.70 Muslim majority is one if 50.1% or more of 
the country’s population is Muslim; it is zero otherwise.71 Female labor 
force (t-1), % is the percentage of the formal labor force comprised of 
women in country i, lagged one year.72 
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The Formation of Coalitions 
Table 1 reports results from models in which coalition formation is 
the dependent variable. Countries that adopted quotas prior to 1995 
are omitted from the analysis (Eritrea, Tanzania, Uganda). A positive 
coefficient indicates that the variable correlates with a higher likeli-
hood of formation and that a coalition is likely to form sooner. Model 
1 includes international variables. Model 2 adds domestic political and 
socioeconomic controls. 
As the first quantitative study of the rise of coalitions for gender 
quotas, our results are preliminary but nonetheless suggestive. Start-
ing with international factors, the variable for international wom-
en’s movement is positive but does not attain statistical significance. 
We note, however, that the global movement and time, which is posi-
tive and statistically significant, has a correlation of 0.88. If we omit 
time from the model, the variable for international women’s move-
ment becomes significant. Our interpretation is that if coalitions are 
Table 1. Correlates of the emergence of coalitions, 1989–2014 (discrete time complemen-
tary log-log event history models) 
 International  + Domestic  
 Factors 1  Factors 2 
International Factors 
International women’s movement  0.12 (0.20)  0.20 (0.19) 
Log women’s NGOs at Beijing per 1 million  –0.18 (0.49)  –0.01 (0.79) 
Int’l women’s move x log women’s NGOs  0.04 (0.05)  0.03 (0.08) 
Log DAC aid per capita (t-1)  –0.24** (0.08)  –0.37** (0.12) 
Domestic Factors 
Postconflict  —  4.41** (1.54) 
Level of democracy  —  0.05 (0.04) 
Number of ethnopolitical groups  —  0.17** (0.05) 
Plurality electoral system  —  –1.11* (0.56) 
Log GNI per capita (t-1)  —  –0.55* (0.24) 
Muslim majority  —  1.31** (0.46) 
Time  0.12** (0.04)  0.19*** (0.05) 
Postconflict x time  —  –0.29* (0.13) 
Constant  –4.91** (1.65)  –3.85 (2.78) 
Log-pseudolikelihood  –106.06  –94.71 
Number of observations  713  713 
Number of coalitions  28  28 
Number of countries  41  41 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.  
+ p < 0.1 ; * p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01 ; *** p < 0.001 ; two-tailed tests. 
Kang &  Tripp  in  Perspect ives  on  P ol it ics  16  (2018)       14
more likely to form with every new year, it is because of the activity 
of the international movement. The variable for embeddedness and 
the interaction term are not statistically significant. Countries with 
higher levels of foreign aid from established democracies appear less 
likely and slower to see the rise of coalitions; in a few of our robust-
ness checks, this negative relationship does not hold. 
Turning to model 2, coalitions appear to form more quickly in post-
conflict countries, but the relationship changes over time.73 Coalitions 
do not appear to be more likely or faster to form the more democratic 
the country is. The variable for the number of politically relevant eth-
nic groups is positive and statistically significant, although in our ro-
bustness check, an alternative measure that does not change over time 
and covers fewer countries, Daniel Posner’s Politically Relevant Eth-
nic Groups (PREG), does not attain statistical significance.74 Coalitions 
are significantly faster and more likely to form in poorer and majority 
Muslim countries and significantly slower to form in countries with 
plurality electoral systems. 
Thus far, our results suggest that women’s coalitions are more 
likely to form as time progresses and mixed evidence that women’s 
coalitions are more likely to emerge where there are more politicized 
ethnic groups. We now explore whether countries with women’s co-
alitions are more likely to adopt gender quotas, controlling for these 
factors. 
The Adoption of Gender Quotas 
A simple cross tabulation presented in Table 2 suggests that there 
is a relationship between coalitions and the adoption of quotas. Co-
alitions for gender quotas emerged in 33 countries, of which 21 ad-
opted a gender quota law or reserved seat system (63.6%). Of the 21 
countries with no coalition, eight adopted a gender quota law or re-
served seat system (38.1%). That some countries with coalitions did 
not adopt quotas and that others with quotas did not have coalitions 
suggest that our coding of coalitions is independent of whether they 
were successful. 
Table 3 reports results that support our hypothesis that countries 
with domestic women’s coalitions are more likely to adopt gender 
quotas and to do so faster than countries with no coalitions. Models 1 
and 2 reflect the state of the quantitative scholarship. In model 3, we 
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add our measure of women’s coalitions, and in model 4, we exclude 
two variables with missing data to use the full sample of 50 countries. 
The variable for coalition is positive and statistically significant 
in both models. The international women’s movement does not cor-
relate with adoption, but the variable for time is positive and statisti-
cally significant. A country’s embeddedness in the international wom-
en’s movement is positively associated with adoption, and in model 4 
the variable attains a conventional level of significance. The interac-
tion term has a negative sign and is variably significant. The sign for 
the variable of aid from democracies is positive, and in three models 
the variable attains conventional levels of significance. 
As expected, the variable for postconflict is positive and statisti-
cally significant. There is mixed evidence that adoption is more likely 
in countries with lower levels of democracy. Using the Ethnic Power 
Table 2. Coalitions and the Adoption of Gender Quotas, 1989–2014 
                   Adoption                No adoption 
Coalition  
 Algeria  Morocco  Cameroon  Mali 
 Burkina Faso  Niger  Central African  Namibia 
 Burundi  Rwanda     Republic  Nigeria 
 Cape Verde  Senegal  Cote d’Ivoire  Sierra Leone
 Congo, Dem. Rep.  Somalia  Ghana  South Africa 
 Egypt  South Sudan  Guinea-Bissau  Zambia 
 Guinea  Sudan  Madagascar  
 Kenya  Togo   
 Liberia  Tunisia   
 Libya  Zimbabwe   
 Mauritania    
   N = 21   N = 12 
No coalition 
 Angola   Benin  The Gambia
 Congo, Rep.   Botswana  Malawi 
 Djibouti   Chad  Mauritius 
 Eritrea   Comoros  Mozambique 
 Lesotho   Equatorial  Sao Tome &
 Swaziland      Guinea    Principe 
 Tanzania   Ethiopia  Seychelles 
 Uganda   Gabon  
   N = 8   N = 13 
Gender quotas refer to laws or reserved seats systems. In the statistical analyses, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, and South Sudan are excluded due to missing data or late 
independence. 
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Relations’ count of the number of politicized ethnic groups, we find a 
negative and significant relationship; when we employ Posner’s mea-
sure, the correlation does not hold. The relationship between the in-
troduction of quotas and electoral system varies over time, with plu-
rality systems being less likely to adopt. The variable for wealth is not 
significant, while the variable for Muslim-majority changes in sign (in 
robustness checks) and level of significance. 
In table 4, we add four control variables and continue to find that 
women’s coalitions are significantly and positively associated with 
the adoption of gender quotas. Model 1 suggests that countries that 
recently experienced a democratic transition are not more likely or 
faster to adopt gender quotas. Leftist countries and countries with 
higher percentages of women in parliament do not appear to be more 
likely or faster to adopt. The variable for women in the labor force 
is negative and attains significance, but the result is not robust in 
Table 3. Correlates of the adoption of gender quotas, 1989–2014 (discrete time complementary log-log event history 
models) 
 International  + Domestic  + Women’s  Full sample 
 Factors 1  Factors 2  Coalition 3   of Countries 4
Women’s coalition    2.40*** (0.59)  1.93*** (0.47) 
International Factors 
   International women’s movement  0.14 (0.25)  –0.05 (0.26)  –0.26 (0.30)  –0.24 (0.21) 
   Log women’s NGOs at Beijing per 1 million  0.34 (0.40)  0.56 (0.43)  0.98 (0.60)  0.93* (0.37) 
   Int’l women’s move x log women’s NGOs  –0.03 (0.04)  –0.04 (0.04)  –0.101 (0.05)  –0.09* (0.03) 
   Log DAC aid per capita (t–1)  0.43 (0.27)  0.80* (0.36)  0.87** (0.29)  0.50* (0.23) 
Domestic Factors 
   Postconflict  —  2.17** (0.78)  2.69** (0.88)  1.29** (0.45) 
   Level of democracy  —  –0.01 (0.05)  –0.02 (0.05)  –0.10* (0.04) 
   Number of ethnopolitical groups  —  –0.08 (0.08)  –0.17* (0.08)  — 
   Plurality electoral system  —  2.21 (1.68)  1.91 (1.68)  — 
   Log GNI per capita (t–1)  —  –0.43 (0.33)  –0.18 (0.31)  –0.21 (0.21) 
   Muslim majority  —  0.891 (0.50)  0.37 (0.51)  0.13 (0.44) 
Time  0.13** (0.04)  0.28*** (0.06)  0.21*** (0.06)  0.12** (0.04) 
Plurality x time  —  –0.19* (0.09)  –0.18* (0.09)  — 
Constant  –8.29** (2.61)  –7.231 (3.96)  –6.78 (4.18)  –4.441 (2.48) 
Log-pseudolikelihood  –93.67  –79.88  –70.38  –99.72 
Number of observations  863  863  863  1088 
Number of adoptions  23  23  23  27 
Number of countries  44  44  44  50 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. 
+ p < 0.1 ; * p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01 ; *** p < 0.001 ; two-tailed tests. 
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alternative models. When we end the study period in 2008, using Mel-
anie Hughes and her colleagues’ measure of embeddedness, coalitions 
continue to be related to adoption. 
To examine the substantive impact of domestic coalitions on the 
adoption of gender quotas, we predict the probability of adopting a 
gender quota for a baseline group, as reported in Table 5. We use re-
sults from model 3 in table 3 to calculate the probabilities, and be-
cause likelihood of adoption changes over time, we choose 2000 as 
the year. For an average country that is not postconflict and does not 
have a women’s coalition, the probability of adopting a quota in 2000 
Table 4. Correlates of the adoption of gender quotas, alternative control variables (discrete time complementary log-log 
event history models) 
 + Democratic  + Left-Leaning  + Women in + Women’s Labor Years:  
 transition 1  Rule 2  Parliament 3   Force 4  1989-2008 5 
Women’s coalition  2.02*** (0.46)  2.09*** (0.46)  2.08*** (0.46)  1.99*** (0.47)  1.79** (0.65) 
International Factors 
   International women’s  -0.19 (0.22)  -0.19 (0.23)  -0.21 (0.23)  -0.11 (0.26)  -0.16 (0.66)  
       movement 
   Log women’s NGOs at Beijing   1.241 (0.65)  1.17* (0.59)  1.211 (0.65)  1.081 (0.63)  1.34 (0.90)a  
       per 1 million
   Int’l women’s move x log  -0.121 (0.06)  -0.11* (0.05)  -0.111 (0.06)  -0.101 (0.06)  -0.12 (0.08)  
      women’s NGOs
   Log DAC aid per capita (t–1)  0.511 (0.27)  0.481 (0.27)  0.501 (0.29)  0.70** (0.27)  0.72* (0.36) 
Domestic Factors 
   Postconflict  1.92* (0.84)  2.01** (0.75)  1.98* (0.80)  2.14* (0.87)  1.57* (0.70) 
   Level of democracy  -0.081 (0.05)  -0.091 (0.05)  -0.091 (0.05)  -0.06 (0.05)  -0.19* (0.08) 
   Number of ethnopolitical groups  -0.16* (0.07)  -0.15* (0.07)  -0.15* (0.07)  -0.19* (0.08)  -0.101 (0.06) 
   Democratic transition  0.56 (0.62) 
   Left-leaning rule   0.34 (0.47) 
   Women in parliament, %    0.02 (0.03) 
   Female labor force, % (t–1)     -0.07** (0.03) 
   Log GNI per capita (t–1)  -0.07 (0.27)  -0.16 (0.32)  -0.07 (0.26)  -0.42 (0.34)  -0.71 (0.49) 
   Muslim majority  -0.08 (0.43)  -0.06 (0.44)  0.01 (0.40)  -0.59 (0.57)  -0.86 (0.74) 
Time  0.11* (0.05)  0.11* (0.05)  0.10* (0.05)  0.13* (0.05)  0.13 (0.23) 
Constant  -4.90 (3.24)  -4.38 (3.44)  -4.84 (3.22)  -1.12 (4.55)  -2.05 (4.61) 
Log-pseudolikelihood  -93.35  -93.60  -93.65  -85.80  -52.21 
Number of observations  1014  1014  1009 969  851 
Number of adoptions  26  26  26  25  13 
Number of countries  47  47  47  46  47 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. + p < 0.1 ; * p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01 ; *** 
p < 0.001 ; two-tailed tests. 
a. Share of total women’s INGOs in country i. 
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is .04. If a women’s coalition exists, the probability jumps to .37. If 
the country is postconflict and there is no coalition, the probability is 
higher, at .47. When we change the number of women’s NGOs at Bei-
jing from the 50th to the 90th percentile (from .37 to 1.45 NGOs per 1 
million inhabitants), the probability of adoption is .06. Using the base-
line and changing the year to 2010, the probability of adoption is .28. 
The connection between coalitions and the adoption of gender quo-
tas comes near or surpasses that of other major explanatory factors. 
In results not reported here, we include more controls, and wom-
en’s coalitions correlate with the adoption of gender quotas in all these 
models. Whether countries have an official state religion does not 
correlate with the adoption of gender quotas while the percentage 
of the population that is Catholic does.75 The year in which country 
i ratified CEDAW does not correlate with adoption.76 We do not in-
clude a variable for whether a country ratified CEDAW because only 
three countries had not ratified CEDAW or ratified CEDAW during the 
study period: Mauritania (2001), Sudan (not ratified), and Swaziland 
(2004). As a final robustness check, we exclude potentially influen-
tial countries. 
In all, we find clear support for the proposition that domestic 
women’s coalitions are associated with the adoption of gender quotas. 
Coalitions for quotas do not appear to be endogenous to foreign aid 
from established democracies or to country ties to the international 
women’s movement but do seem to be connected to the march of time. 
Table 5. Predicted probabilities of the adoption of gender quotas by the end of 2000 
 Predicted probability of adoption 
Baseline  .04 
Women’s coalition=1  .37 
Women’s coalition=0, Postconflict=1  .47 
Women’s coalition=1, Postconflict=1  .99 
Women’s coalition=0, Postconflict=0,  .06 
    Women’s NGOs at Beijing per 1 million=1.45 
Baseline + 10 years (Year52010)  .28 
The mean predicted probability of adoption is calculated using the coefficients from model 
3 in table 3. In the baseline prediction, women’s coalition and postconflict is 0. For all rows, 
the international women’s movement is 7.75 (the 2000 value).We report the anti-log of Log 
women’s NGOs at Beijing per 1 million at the 50th percentile (top four and sixth rows) and 
90th percentile (fifth row). Log DAC aid per capita (t–1) and log GNI per capita (t–1) are set 
at the mean. Level of democracy is 0 and the number of ethnopolitical groups is 5 (the me-
dian values). Plurality electoral system and Muslim majority are 0. 
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We find mixed support for our claim that coalitions are more likely to 
emerge in contexts where ethnicity is highly politicized. Yet, control-
ling for all these factors, coalitions are strongly and positively related 
to quota adoption. Whether a country is postconflict, the amount of 
aid it receives from established democracies, and the year also corre-
late with adoption. 
Comparative Case Study: Benin and Senegal 
Our large-scale analysis shows that between 1989 and 2014, wom-
en’s coalitions correlate with the adoption of gender quotas. A most-
similar comparison of the passage of a parity law in Senegal and non-
adoption in Benin helps us examine the nuances of our main finding. 
The cases of Benin and Senegal can be generalized to non-post-
conflict democracies that use a mixed or PR electoral system. (Benin 
employs proportional representation, and Senegal has had a parallel 
system since 1983.) Compared to the region, Benin and Senegal re-
ceived average levels of foreign aid, had average levels of GNI per cap-
ita, and had average numbers of politicized ethnic groups (4 and 5, 
respectively; refer to Table 6).77 Domestic women’s organizations in 
Senegal jointly used resources to name underrepresentation as a ma-
jor problem, to propose and adapt new policies, and to signal domes-
tic and broad support for a parity law, which they won in 2010. After 
the passage of the law, the number of female parliamentary repre-
sentatives nearly doubled, jumping from 23 to 43 percent of the seats 
with the 2012 elections. 
In Senegal, the problem of women’s underrepresentation and the 
call for gender quotas was spearheaded by the umbrella group Conseil 
Table 6. A comparison of Benin and Senegal, 1990 
 Benin  Senegal 
GNI per capita (Atlas Method)  360 710 
Overseas development aid, % of GNI   13.9  14.7 
Overseas development aid, per capita (USD)  53.4 108.0 
NGOs at Beijing, per 1 million inhabitants   0.7 2.1 
Female labor force, % of total labor force  41.7 41.8 
Quota law, year  No  2010 
Sources: United Nations N.d.; World Bank 2015.
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sénégalais des femmes (the Senegalese Council of Women, COSEF). 
In 1998, COSEF began raising the issue of quotas with various politi-
cal parties, which promised to voluntarily implement them. After the 
1998 elections, however, it was evident that moral commitment by 
the country’s leaders was insufficient, and COSEF decided it needed a 
legal means to bring about parity. Meanwhile, Abdoulaye Wade, who 
became president of Senegal in 2000, had made campaign promises 
regarding gender parity. In 2004 under Wade, Senegal ratified the Af-
rican Union Maputo Protocol which includes a provision around gen-
der parity. Senegal also added the protocol to its constitution. COSEF 
seized on this moment to advance the issue.78 
Adapting its policy goals toward a gender quota law, in 2005 
COSEF launched the “Together, let’s strengthen democracy with gen-
der parity!” campaign. It received input from various legal and con-
stitutional experts and worked with the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 
Children, and Female Entrepreneurship in a strategic alliance to get 
parity introduced into parliamentary elections. The coalition, however, 
maintained their independence from the ministry. They worked with 
women from political parties and, on March 23, 2007, held a demon-
stration signaling domestic and mass support in which women dressed 
in white and got the parties to support their campaign. 
The National Assembly of Senegal passed a parity law on March 
27, 2007, which was quickly followed on April 2 by a complaint by a 
dozen members of parliament against the law to Senegal’s Constitu-
tional Council. On April 27, the council declared the law unconstitu-
tional, on the grounds of discrimination based on sex.79 
Following the council’s ruling on the unconstitutionality of the par-
ity law, COSEF and its allies strategically adapted and pursued a new 
policy proposal: amend the country’s constitution. Women’s organiza-
tions met with President Wade on October 24, 2007, with Minister of 
Women Awa Ndiaye attending.80 Fatou Kiné Diop, along with leaders of 
the Fédération des associations féminines du Sénégal (FAFS), Fédéra-
tion nationale des groupements de promotion féminine (FNGPF), and 
Réseau Africain de soutien à l’entreprenariat féminin (RASEF) called 
upon Wade to make the principle of parity part of the constitution. 
On December 13 and 26, the National Assembly and Senate, respec-
tively, voted in favor of a bill to amend the constitution to state that 
the law promotes women’s and men’s equal access to public offices 
and positions. The parliament ratified the constitutional amendment 
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on July 23, 2008. Senegal’s gender parity law was adopted on May 28, 
2010, mandating the alternation of party lists between male and fe-
male candidates. Since Senegal has a parallel electoral system, these 
provisions apply to proportional representation party lists and the 
seats contested through the plurality system in multimember constit-
uencies. Thus, in a constituency with five seats, two would have to be 
filled by women. 
To be clear, the international context mattered as did the stra-
tegic calculations of the political elite. Women’s organizations had 
the support of foreign donors and were connected to the interna-
tional women’s movement. Women formed COSEF in the lead-up to 
the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing. After Senegal rat-
ified the Maputo Protocol and added the treaty to its constitution, 
women launched the “Together, let’s strengthen democracy with gen-
der parity!” campaign. External donors such as Friedrich Ebert Stif-
tung (FES), United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), 
among others supported the domestic actors by providing financial 
and technical support.81 Women’s organizations did not do it all on 
their own. Getting the political elite, the women’s ministry, and par-
ties on board was key to their success. Nevertheless, the impetus for 
the gender parity law, strategic adaptations to the national context, 
and demonstration of domestic support came from a coalition of wom-
en’s organizations at the national level. 
In contrast, Benin has not had a women’s coalition for gender quo-
tas. In the 2011 and 2015 elections, women won 10 (7%) of the legis-
lative seats, respectively. Individual women’s activists advocated for 
a gender quota law in Benin, but women’s organizations were either 
unable or uninterested in forming a pro-quota coalition. In 2004, a 
female parliamentarian, Justine Achadé, proposed a parity law.82 The 
Ministry of Family at the time also supported the idea of a gender 
quota law, as well as the president of the National Assembly. In 2006 
and 2008, Alice Kang conducted interviews with women’s activists 
and representatives of international donors and found that the quota 
was not a priority for women leaders and organizations. 
On August 24, 2010, the National Assembly voted in favor of a bill 
that would raise the number of seats in the legislature from 83 to 99 
and install a 20% gender quota. Shortly thereafter, several individuals 
including a president of a women’s association, Marie-Elise Gbedo, in-
admissibly filed a request with the Constitutional Court to examine the 
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constitutionality of the bill. Two members of parliament also filed a 
request with the court. In September, the court invalidated both parts 
of the bill. The court ruled that the size of the assembly could only ex-
pand if there were sufficient financial resources, and that the quota 
violated the constitutional principle of equality between the sexes as 
well as the African Union’s Charter on Human and People’s Rights.83 
Unlike women’s organizations in Senegal, women’s activists in Be-
nin did not adapt a new quota proposal after the ruling despite exter-
nal support for the quota from FES and USAID. One women’s organi-
zation, RIFONGA-Benin has since called for the adoption of a parity 
law, holding workshops with the media in January 2013.84 Other wom-
en’s organizations, however, have shied away from calling for parity 
legislation. To date and to the best of our knowledge, no pro-quota co-
alition has emerged in Benin. 
As the case studies show, a meso-level attention to domestic co-
alitions contributes to micro-level explanations that center on stra-
tegic elites and macro-level explanations that focus on global norms 
and networks. Political leaders in Benin and Senegal strategically sup-
ported the adoption of gender quotas. In the 2000s, the international 
consensus was clear: women and men ought to be equally represented 
in public office. Women in Benin and Senegal were attuned to changes 
occurring at the global level and connected to transnational women’s 
networks. In Senegal, domestic organizations were at the helm of the 
campaign and made key adjustments when obstacles were presented. 
Foreign donors were willing to help women’s organizations push for 
quotas in both countries, but women’s organizations in Benin did not 
come together. Without domestic mobilization in the form of a coali-
tion, external efforts were for naught in Benin, while in Senegal the 
coalition succeeded in introducing a quota. 
The Importance of Domestic Coalitions 
We have found through statistical analysis and a comparative case 
study that without domestic coalitions, it is significantly less likely 
that quota laws are adopted to increase female legislative represen-
tation. These coalitions are constituted by multiple women’s organi-
zations that seek to name new public problems, identify and adopt 
policy solutions, and signal domestic and broad-based support. The 
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coalitions tend to be expansive, cutting across ethnic, religious, party, 
and other differences, particularly when it comes to issues that chal-
lenge societal beliefs and expectations because of the importance of 
showing widespread support of the reform from key sectors of society. 
Although prior work has pointed to the role of women’s move-
ments in advancing such reforms, we contend that it is, in fact, a spe-
cific form of mobilization, i.e., coalitions, that are critical in bringing 
about such legislative change. Broader movements are nonetheless im-
portant, in part, because coalitions can emerge out of them, and we 
would not be surprised to see women’s coalitions for quotas in coun-
tries with vibrant women’s movements. To explore this possibility, it 
is instructive to turn to Mala Htun and S. Laurel Weldon’s dataset on 
women’s movements, in which four of nine African countries were 
coded as having a strong or very strong autonomous feminist move-
ment prior to quota adoption (Botswana, Kenya, Morocco, South Af-
rica). In Kenya and Morocco, a pro-quota women’s coalition emerged, 
but not in Botswana.85 In South Africa, which had a women’s coalition, 
the dominant African National Congress adopted a voluntary party 
quota. We do not assume that all women’s movements will engender 
coalitions for quotas, as the case of Benin illustrates. 
We find that domestic women’s groups play a role in the adoption 
of quotas, above and beyond the efforts of international actors and 
pressures on governments. Still, we concur with previous studies that 
the international women’s movement, a country’s embeddedness in 
the movement, and foreign aid from democracies is important. We do 
not think it is a coincidence that Senegal, which adopted a quota, had 
twice as many women’s organizations per capita attending the UN 
World Conference in Beijing than that of Benin. Yet the importance 
of transnational networking should not be exaggerated. In our anal-
ysis of coalition formation, embeddedness in the international wom-
en’s movement does not predict whether or how quickly women’s co-
alitions emerged. Foreign aid from democracies does not explain the 
rise of women’s coalitions for quotas. Therefore our preliminary anal-
ysis provides an empirical challenge to the claim that women’s coali-
tions in Africa are Western-driven and import foreign values, a charge 
that is often articulated by critics and observers. 
To be clear, we do not argue that coalitions are the only factor driv-
ing major women’s rights reform. We find that countries that came 
out of major armed conflict since the mid-1980s, but especially after 
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2000 are more likely to adopt gender quotas than countries that had 
not. Thus, postconflict countries have higher levels of women’s de-
scriptive representation, where women claim on average 32% of the 
legislative seats compared with non-conflict countries, where women 
claimed 16% of the seats. In results not reported here, having wom-
en’s rights provisions in peace accords also significantly correlate with 
quota adoption. Our results, not surprisingly, also support the claim 
that a country’s type of electoral system matters. Countries with plu-
rality electoral systems appear less likely and slower to form domes-
tic women’s coalitions and adopt gender quota laws than are countries 
with mixed or proportional representation systems. Different electoral 
institutions encourage women’s advocates to pursue different mea-
sures for improving women’s descriptive representation. 
Strikingly, women’s coalitions appear to matter more than other 
domestic factors that are conventionally seen as important. We find 
that authoritarian regimes in Africa are just as likely as democracies 
to have coalitions for quota adoption and to adopt gender quotas, per-
haps to gain greater control of the legislature or to gain greater le-
gitimacy in the global hierarchy of modern market democracies.86 We 
find no significant difference in adoption between countries under 
left-leaning rule and countries under centrist or right-leaning rule, 
although our null finding may reflect the fact that we examine the 
post- Cold War period. Melanie Hughes and Aili Mari Tripp find that 
left-party rule had a significant impact on women’s numerical repre-
sentation in the 1980s; after the fall of the Soviet Union, the relation-
ship disappears.87 Our focus on candidate quota laws and reserved 
seat systems, as opposed to voluntary party quotas, may also mask 
the impact of leftist ideology.88 There does not appear to be a relation-
ship between the percentage of women in parliament and the adop-
tion of quotas. We draw from this null finding that it may take only 
one or a handful of motivated female MPs working together or al-
lied with women’s coalitions to effectively push for reform, affirming 
the importance of having critical actors rather than a critical mass of 
women in office.89 
Women’s coalitions for quotas are forming and appear to be hav-
ing an impact in Muslim-majority countries. In fact, our models sug-
gest that coalitions are more likely to form in Muslim countries than 
in non-Muslim countries, challenging conventional notions about Is-
lam. In our comparative case study, a pro-quota women’s coalition 
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emerged in predominantly Muslim Senegal, which adopted a parity 
law, but not in Benin, where only 24% of the population is Muslim. 
We also note that by the end of 2014, 72% of Muslim-majority coun-
tries in Africa had adopted gender quotas, compared to 52% of Chris-
tian majority and 31% of mixed religion countries. For proponents of 
the Islamic barrier hypothesis, these patterns may be surprising. On 
the other hand, the earliest adopters of reserved seat systems in the 
world were Bangladesh, Egypt, Pakistan, and Sudan. 
We have posited here that women’s coalitions may be more likely 
to form in contexts where ethnicity or race is a dominant cleavage. De-
pending on the measure, we found support for the idea that pro-quota 
coalitions are more likely to emerge in countries where the politiciza-
tion of ethnic difference is stronger. We also find mixed support that 
countries are slower and less likely to adopt quotas in contexts where 
ethnicity is more politicized. More theoretical consideration and em-
pirical work needs to be done to examine how cleavages on one di-
mension that generally favor men present special opportunities and 
challenges for coalition building among women’s organizations. 
Thus, we argue that coalitions formed specifically to increase fe-
male legislative representation through the introduction of quota leg-
islation are essential to bringing about such reforms. We find that in-
ternational pressures are important, but without domestic collective 
action they are insufficient. Our study confirms the importance of 
postconflict factors and the electoral system. Our findings regarding 
the politicization of ethnic difference and the role of ideology are in-
conclusive. We find that the percentage of women in parliament does 
not influence the adoption of quotas, further suggesting that coalitions 
play a greater role than individual women in parliament. 
Implications for Future Research 
We show how women’s collective action at the national level is critical 
in an era of globalization. Nearly every quantitative study of interna-
tional influence and quota adoption mentions activism by women on 
the ground. Up until now, however, few crossnational analyses have 
incorporated the national dimension satisfactorily because of the lack 
of data. International influences on women’s rights adoption have 
been easier to quantify, and empirical work has focused accordingly. 
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Using a new data set, we found that the formation of domestic coali-
tions corresponds with the adoption of gender quotas in Africa, even 
when controlling for connections to the international women’s move-
ment, the strength of the global women’s movement, and international 
aid from established democracies. 
A broader implication of our study is that theories of transnational 
activism do not fully consider the politics behind policymaking. In the 
boomerang and spiral models that explore these dynamics, domestic 
groups facing a repressive government reach out to other countries 
and international bodies to put pressure on unresponsive states.90 Yet 
as many governments have liberalized or have adopted pro-women’s 
rights policies as part of their modernizing posture, the assumption 
of the obstructive state may be less relevant today. The models pro-
vide a useful but incomplete understanding of politics at the national 
level, leaving open questions about whether women’s organizations 
matter because of international forces or for reasons that go above 
and beyond them. This study proposed that domestic women’s orga-
nizations perform significant advocacy work in naming public prob-
lems, identifying and adapting policy proposals, and signaling domes-
tic and broad-based support. A more integrative theory of political 
change considers the preferences and collective action of domestic 
actors outside the state. 
Moreover, looking primarily at the impact of international pres-
sures on domestic politics makes it difficult to appreciate the ways 
in which domestic actors themselves influence global norms. African 
women’s rights activists, for example, have influenced global discus-
sions regarding quota adoption, gender budgeting, peacebuilding, mi-
crocredit, and many other concerns.91 
Our study points to important new directions for scholarship on 
women, gender, and politics. Scholars should examine whether coali-
tions have an impact in the same way around other women’s rights 
concerns, and why coalitions sometimes fail to influence policy. Coun-
try studies should examine further in depth the role of domestic allies 
in women’s policy agencies, political parties, and women’s parliamen-
tary groups in bringing about reform. Scholars and policymakers also 
need more nuanced, issue-specific measures of aid (e.g., foreign aid to 
women’s organizations) to assess whether shifts in funding priorities 
affect the efficacy of group-level collective action. Peace Medie finds 
that women’s organizations play a crucial role in enforcing domestic 
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violence laws in Liberia, raising the question of whether coalitions in-
fluence policy implementation.92 
Our study has clear implications for understanding major change 
in other types of reform. To understand how reform occurs on issues 
related to the environment, health, human rights, and labor it is nec-
essary to look not just at social movements but also at the specific co-
alitions that emerge around particular issues. These coalitions are of-
ten inspired or aided by treaties and external pressures, but without 
such coalitions the agreements, especially around controversial issues, 
are not necessarily enforced. Future comparative work should extend 
this study to other areas to see whether there are differences in the 
impact of coalitions on other issues such as environmental concerns, 
human rights, or labor issues. 
Women around the world are entering public office in greater 
numbers than ever before. As such, researchers are seeking to un-
derstand the policy impact of female elected officials. Thus far, the 
existing scholarship finds that there are limits to descriptive repre-
sentation; increasing the number of women in office alone does not 
automatically translate into women’s substantive representation.93 Our 
work, combined with previous scholarship on women’s movements, 
suggests that coalitions of organizations can help make elected offi-
cials act for the interests of marginalized groups such as women, serv-
ing as a missing link between individual voters and those in power. 
Whether in Benin, Senegal, or the United States, the challenges and 
potential of building domestic coalitions endure. We call for more at-
tention to the power of collective action among organizations, not just 
across, but also within national borders. 
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39 Holmsten, Moser, and Slosar 2010. 
40 Tripp 2015b. 
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42 Singer and Willett 2003, 523. 
43 Ibid, 421. 
44 The results concerning coalitions as an independent variable are substantively 
similar when we use logistic discrete-time models and when we use cubic time 
polynomials. Our findings about coalitions are also similar when we use the con-
tinuous-time Cox and Weibull models. Where coalition formation is the depen-
dent variable, we include an interaction term of Postconflict and Time. Where 
quota adoption is the dependent variable, we include an interaction term of Plu-
rality and Time. After using Cox models, we use the postestimation estat phtest, 
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45 This is in line with Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015. We seek to introduce more 
rigor in coding the dependent variable by locating the country’s constitution or 
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and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 2015. 
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50 Kayuni and Muriaas 2014. 
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52 Hughes, Krook, and Paxton 2015. International women’s movement is based on a 
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ber of international conferences, UN treaties and UN groups on women; and 
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